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CASES NOTED
REAL PROPERTY-DUE PROCESS-
PLAT RECONSTRUCTION STATUTE INVALID
The seller of land sought a declaratory decree as to the validity of
a Florida statute' requiring the recordation of plats as a condition prece-
dent to the conveyance of certain size plots of land.2 Held, the statute
is an unreasonable restraint on the right to alienate property under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1958).
There are two facets to the problem presented by this case: (1) The
extent of the state's police power as contained in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and; (2) the application of the equal pro-
tection clause in regard to the reasonableness of state police regulations.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has passed
through three phases of judicial interpretation since its ratification in
1868. Between that date and the middle 1880's the due process clause was
never used to check state economic and social legislation.3 Until the
middle 1930's, it was utilized by the United States Supreme Court to
invalidate economic and social legislation of the states since such legislation
was contrary to the Court's laissez-faire economic theory.4 From the middle
nineteen-thirties to the present, the Court has developed a strong pre-
sumption of validity in favor of these state regulations.5 In Williamson v.
1. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 30202, § 3, at 271. "Whenever any land, a plat of which
has not been recorded in the Public Records of the county wherein the land lies, shall
be platted into lots, blocks, parcels, tracts or other portions, however designated, so
that any of the same shall comprise one acre or less in size, and whenever any land,
a plat of which has been recorded in the county wherein such land lies, is replatted
into lots, blocks, parcels, tracts or other portions, however designated, so that any of
the same shall comprise one-half acre or less in size, a plat thereof shall be recorded
in the Public Records of the county wherein such land lies." The statute applies to
counties with a population in excess of 300,000.
2. The facts of the instant case fit the two classifications of the statute exactly.
3. 2 CUSHMAN, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62 (1938).
4. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment a state cannot fix the compensation that an employment
agency may charge for its services; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927),
state statute fixing prices to be charged for admission to public contests, exhibitions,
games or performances violates the due process clause; Wolff Co. v. Industrial Ct., 267
U. S. 552 (1925), state statute which provided for submission of controversies to com-
pulsory settlement by state agency and compulsory fixing of wages and hours violates
the due process clause because this compels the parties to continue in business on
terms that were not agreed upon; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915), state
statute making it a misdemeanor for employer to require an employee to agree not to
become a member of any labor organization during time of employment is in violation
of the due process clause; Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U. S. 45 (1905), state statute
forbidding employment of bakers for more than 60 hours per week or 10 hours per
day violates the due process clause; See also CUSHMAN, supra note 3, at 67, 69; SWISHER,
AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 813 (1943).
5. CUSHMAN, supra note 3, at 76-77, 81; SwishER, supra note 4, at 99; Wooo,
DUE PROCESS oF LAW 181-2 (1951); See cases cited, infra note 6.
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Lee Optical Company, the Court held that there was no violation of the
due process clause where a state statute forbade an unlicensed optician
to practice optometry. In that case, the Court stated that it would no
longer use the due process clause to strike down state laws regulating
business and industrial conditions even though they might be unwise,
lacking in foresight, or were out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.7
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment has always been generous to the state's police
power dealing with fraudY8 In Schmidinger v. Chicago the Court upheld
a state statute which regulated the making and selling of loaves of bread.
It was reasoned that local authorities and not the courts are the judges
of the necessities of local situations calling for the exercise of the police
power. The judiciary may only interfere with such laws when they are so
arbitrary as to be obviously and unmistakably in excess of any reasonable
authority conferred.' 0 It was further set forth that laws and ordinances
tending to prevent frauds have long been upheld as valid exertions of
the police power." The Florida Legislature in adopting this recordation
statute to prevent land contracts involving fraudulent schemes and maintain
zoning requirements was acting within the limits of a state's police power
as defined by the United States Supreme Court.
In the early history of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment the United States Supreme Court mantained rigorous require-
ments that persons be treated alike where economic and social legislation
6. 348 U. S. 483 (1954); See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S.
421 (1952), a state statute which entitled an employee to absent himself from work
to vote on election days without a loss of wages was not a denial of equal protection
or due process to the employer; Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220 (1949), state
statute which denies insurers or their agents the right to engage in the undertaking
business and denies an undertaker the right to serve as an agent of an insurance company
does not violate the two clauses; Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525(1949), state statute forbidding closed shop arrangements and guaranteeing right to work
to all does not deny the employer nor the union due process or equal protection; Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941), state statute limiting the amount an employment
agency may charge for its services does not violate the due process clause, overruling
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); Vest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379 (1937), where plaintiff chambermaid sued for statutory minimum wage, the Court
held such setting of minimum wage by state statute does not violate due process clause;
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), where grocer sold milk in violation of state
minimum price there was no violation of due process of law.
7. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. 488 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Naltional Fertilizer Assn., Inc. v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1936)
state statute requiring tag disclosing contents before offering a mixed commercial
fertilizer for sale does not deny due process of law; Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram
Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U. S.
427 (1919), state statute requiring branding of syrup compounds before they can be
sold was a valid exercise of police power. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11 (1905); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, (1903); Minnesotta v. Barber, 136 U. S.
313, 320 (1890) Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).
9. 226 U. S. 578 (1913).
10. Id. at 588.
11. Ibid.
[VOL. XlIl
CASES NOTED
was concerned. 12 The Court now respects the determination by the state
legislature that a classification is reasonable and necessary even though
the result reached is ill advised, unequal, and oppressive legislation."
As early as 1910, in the Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company4 case
it was held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
permits great discretion by the state in regard to classifications established
in the adoption of police laws.' 5 Such classifications will be held invalid
only when they are purely arbitrary or without any reasonable basis. 16
Generally, the Supreme Court of Florida presumes the validity of
state legislation.' 7 However, in the instant case the court concluded that
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Conuolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1901), state statute directed against combinations in trade made
to affect prices of commodities violated the equal protection clause by excluding agri-
cultural products from its operation while in hands of producer; Cotting v. Kansas City
Stock Yards Co,, 183 U. S. 79 (1901), state statute regulating charges of a particular
stock yards company in the State, but which exempted certain stock yards from its
operation denied to that company equal protection; Duluth & Iron Range R.R. Co. v.
St. Louis County, 179 U. S. 302 (1900), state statute which exempted railroad land
and property of a company from all taxation and all assessment violated equal protection;
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (1897), state statute which singles
out railroads and requires them to pay attorney fees in certain suits violates equal
protection; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), administration of a municipal
ordinance denying to Chinese the right to engage in laundry busincss within the state
violates equal protection; See CUSHMAN, supra note 3, at 69.
13. ROTTSCHAEFFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND Socio ECONOMnC CHANGE, 154;
TUSSMAN & TEN BRORK, Equal Protection of the Laws, 34 CALIF. L. Rrv. 341 (1949).
14. 220 U. S. 61 (1911).
15. Id. at 78. See also Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U. S. 231, 237 (1953),
where city under authority of a state statute imposed an income tax on gross salaries
and wages of employed persons but only on net profits of self employed persons such
statute on its face was not violative of due process or equal protection clauses; Old
Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936), court upheld
a fair trade act as not violative of equal protection of the law even though it confers
a privilege upon producers and owners of goods identified by trade-mark, brand or
name when it denies such privilege to unidentified goods; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S.
404, 422, 423 (1935), the imposition of a tax upon dividends earned outside the state,
from which tax dividends earned within the state are exempt, constitutes reasonable
classification; Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942),
state statute requiring sterilization of "habitual criminals" as one who was convicted
two or more times of "felonies involving moral terpitude" as applied to person convicted
of stealing chickens once and twice for robberies denied equal protection; New York
Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573 (1938), state statute granting
utilities subject to supervision by New York Dept. of Public Service a privilege tax of
3% of gross incomes does not deny equal protection; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1936), state statute which lays progressively increasing rate
of taxation on chain store's business done inside the state while considering all stores
inside as well as outside of the state does not arbitrarily discriminate against chains of-
a national or sectional character in favor of local chains; Dominion Hotel, Inc. v.
Arizona, 249 U. S. 265 (1919), state statute restricting hours of labor for women in
hotels but which exempts in part railroad restaurants or eating houses upon railroad
rights of way does not violate equal protection.
16. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911).
17. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572, 577 (Fla. 1958). See also Wright v. Board of
Public Instr., 48 So.2d 912, 914 (Fla. 1950); Waybright v. Duval County, 142 Fla. 875,
878, 196 So. 430, 432 (1940); Ex Parte White, 131 Fla. 83, 93, 178 So. 876, 880(1938); State ex rel Landis v. Prevatt, 110 Fla. 29, 32, 148 So. 578, 579 (1933);
Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton County, 95 Fla. 632, 665, 116 So. 771, 783 (1928).
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the statutory requirements imposed on the vendor were an "unreasonable"
restraint on the right to alienate property.' This is in agreement with
the dicta in Garvin v. Baker' stating it was not necessary that a plat or
map be recorded before property could be sold. The court in the instant
case further held that the statute establishing the classifications did so
unreasonably and hence was discriminatory and was in violation of the
equal protection clause.20
Scholarly authority agrees that the due process and equal protection
clauses are not violated by state legislation similar to that under con-
sideration.' As one writer expressed it, "Any measure which could gather
enough support to pass the legislature would be upheld by the Court, '22
Comparable legislation has been adopted in states other than Florida, but
as yet there has been no judicial interpretation on the precise point in-
volved in this case. 281 It does not appear that either the regulatory effect
or the classification of the statute is so "utterly unreasonable"2 4 or "without
any reasonable basis," 25 as to justify the court in invalidating it under the
fourteenth amondment. It appears that the court was in error in holding
that this law was arbitrary. The Supreme Court of Florida should accept
the present federal position on the impact of the due process and equal
protection clauses on property and contract rights.
BRUcx RE.ZcX
18. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572, 577 (Fla. 1958).
19. 59 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla. 1952) (dictum), where plaintiff sought writ of
mandamus to compel officials to approve proposed plat for real estate subdivision.
".. It is not necessary that a plat or a map of a person's property showing lots and
blocks be recorded before it can be sold. It may be more convenient to sell by lots and
blocks as was shown by a recorded plat, but he may sell it by the inch, the foot, or
the yard, and describe it by metes and bounds."
20. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572, 577-8 (Fla. 1958).
21. 2 CUSHMAN, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CoNsTITUlONAL LAw, 76.7, 81 (1938);
SwislEm, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAIL DFVELOPMENT 99 (1943); WooD, DuE PRocEss
OF LAw 181-2 (1951); IIET1ERINGTON, State Economic Regulation and Substantive
Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 13 (1958).
22. -IETHERINcTON, supra note 19 at 25.
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-479 (1956): oAlno CorE §§ 50-2501, 2512 (1957); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 109 §§ 1, 2, 5, 35 (1957); IowA CoDE ANN. § 409.45, 14, 15, 16 (1946);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.29, § 505.08 (1945); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 17-415, 426 (1943);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 334; S. C. CODE § 60-207 (1952); TENN. CODE § 13-606
S1956); VA. CODE §§ 15-781, 784, 796 (1956); \Vis. STAT. ch. 236.16 (1953), Ws.
TAr. ANN. ch. 236.31 (1953). These statutes differ from the statute under consideration
in the penalty imposed for violation of the statute.
24. Sclumidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578, 587 (1913); See Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487 (1954), both the due process and equal protection
clauses were at issue in this case.
25. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911). See Walters
v. City of St. Louis, 347 U. S. 231, 237 (1953).
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